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Foreign-trade  barriers*at benefit a single fm  or industry  are
more likely to increase with discretionary  trade policies and
under dictatorships.  And although  these barriers  may produce
short-run  benefits,  in the long  run they  have  a negative  effect  on
the growth  rates of output and exports.
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This paper  - a product  of the Trade  Policy Division,  Policy  Research  Department  - is part of a larger
effort  in the  department  to understand  the political  economy  of protection.  Copies  of the  paperare available
free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Dawn  Ballantyne,
room  NI0-023, extension  37947  (May 1993r  17  pages).
Using a time-series  approach,  Rama analyzes  the  scales  the annual  number  of regulations  by
relationship  between  the extent of rent-seeking  output  or exports  to measure  the extent of rent-
trade policy and both political  and economic  seeking  trade policy.
variables.  For rent-seeking  trade policy,  the
indicator  he uses is the number  of foreign-trade  Rama  shows  that the extent of rent-seeking
regulations  passed  each year for the benefit of a  trade  policy increased  with discretionary  policies
single firn or industry.  and under  dictatorship.  (In the period  studied,
there were two stages of democracy  - until
Rama uses data from Uruguay  for 1925-83.  1932  and from 1943-72  - and two stages of
Uruguay,  which  experienced  an impressive  dictatorship.)  He also shows that rent-seeking
economic  decline,  is an outstanaing  example  of a  trade restrictions  increased  under import-substi-
rent-seeking  society.  After being a wealthy  tution strategies  and, more unexpectedly,  under
economy  in midcentury,  ;t suffered almost  active  export  promotion.  This suggests  that
complete  stagnation,  which led to social  and  di3cretionary  power  leads to wasteful  uistribu-
political  disintegration  by the end of the 1960s.  tion, whether  it is used to support  inward-  or
Three decades  of restrictive  regulations  on  outward-oriented  policies.
foreign  trade had created  a nearly closed
economy  by the end of the 1960s.  It was worth  Finally,  Rama haalyzes  the correlation
analyzing  whether  policymakers'  great recep-  between  innovations  in the trade  policy indicator
tiveness  to demands  for protection  could  account  and innovations  in the growth  rates of output  and
for Uruguay's  decline.  exports,  with a lag of up to 20 years. Surpris-
ingly,  he finds  a positive  correlation  with output
Over the period 1925-83,  Rama finds almost  growth  rates after two or three years. But the
4,000 laws,  decrees, and administrative  correlation  becomes  negative  some years later,
resolutions  that create,  maintain,  or modify  a  particularly  in the case of exports.  The short-run
foreign-trade  regulation  for the benefit of a  positive  impact  on growth  rates, together  with
single  firn or industry.  About  half of them  the surprisingly  long time lag before the negative
explicitly  identify  the petitioner-  usually  a firm  impact,  may account  for policymakers'  recep-
or guild.  Since the size of the Uruguayan  tiveness  to demands  for protection.
economy  changed  over the period  studied,  Rama
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In contrast with the theory of international trade, which treats trade
be ri2rs as exogenous, the political economy of protection focuses on the
process leading to transfers in favor of specific groups at the expense of the
general public.  Based on the economic self-interest approach, it chowo that
the conduct of trade policy depends on both the objectives of policy makers
and the institutional setting governing the interaction between them and the
gainers and losers from protection.  It shows, moreover, that significant
welfare losses may arise from compctition among the potential recipients of
the transfers.1
Although the theory is very suggestive, assessing its empirical
relevance is not an easy task.  The diversity of trade policy instruments
makes a sound estimate of the quantity and the importance of trade
restrictions difficult, particularly as regards non-tariff barriers.  For thLi
reason, applied research has been concerned either with the voting behavior of
congressmen on trade issues, or with the cross-section relationship between
tariff rates and industry characteristics.2 In addition, a number of
interesting case studies have appeared.
However, the data used in this applied research are not the best suited
to deal with some specific aggregate-level issues.  Thus, according to the
theory, different institutional settings should lead to different levels of
protection (see Weck-Hannemann, 1991); but what are the actual consequences of
changes in the discretionary power of polltical agents?  Similarly, Olson
(1982) has convincingly argued that policies promoted by distributional
coalitions have to do with the long-run  decline of nations; but how
significant is the effect, and what are the time lags involved?
Baldwin  (1989), Hillman (1989), Magee, Brock and Young (1989)  and
Mueller  (1989, chapter 13) provide comprehensive surveys of this
approach.
2  For an application of the cross-sectional approach to  developing
countries, see Amelung (1989).
1To address such aggregate-level Lssues, thls paper adopts a time-aeries
approach. 3 The chose trade pclicy indicator is the yearly number of statutes
which create, maintain or modify a foreign-trade regulation for the benefit of
a single firm or industry.  Typical examples are the setting of a tariff for a
final good, or the reduction of an import duty for an input.  But the statutes
may also concern export subsidies, special exchange rates, reference prices
(i.e. the gaugings on which tariffs are applled), draw-back regimes, import
licenses, export prohibitions, suspension of tax payments, etc.
The data are from Uruguay, 1925-1983.  ThL  is a very interesting
country from the viewpoint of the political economy of protection, since it
represents an extreme example of import-substitution policies.  In spite of a
population of less than three million people, three decades of restrictive
regulations on foreign trade led to an almost closed economy by the 1960s.
But the subsequent opening up was based on discretionary policies too,
particularly in the late 1970s.  Hence, one can expect Uruguay to be a good
example of the rent-seeking society. 4
The Uruguayan record is also interesting as regards economic growth.
After being a wealthy country by the middle of the century, with a real Lncome
per capita similar to that of Belgium or Denmark, Lt ran into an almost
ccmplete stagnation, which led to social and polLtical dLisntegration by the
end of the 1960..  Hence, it is  worth analyzing whether the conduct of trade
policy, with its openness to private demands for protection, can account for
the Uruguayan declLne.
Last but not least, during 1925-1983 there were two periode of democracy
(until 1932, and from 1943 to 1972) and two periods under dictatorship.  The
A time-series approach had been already used by Tacaks (1981) and
by Magee and Young (1987).  The first of these papers explained
changes in the demand for protection  in the U.S. as resulting from
macroeconomic  conditions.  The second one tested for a negative
relationship between protection levels and the labor/capital
ratio, under the assumption that U.S. tariffs protect labor.
4  For a presentation of recent Uruguayan economic history, see Rama
(1991).
2latter resulted from economic crises: the Great Depression  in the first case,
the 1960. stagnation in the second one.  These shifts enable us to assess the
role of the political regime in the determination of trade policy, in contrast
with the available theoretical and empirical studies, which have focused
almost exclusively on democratic settings.
The next section discusses the criteria used to distinguish the
foreign-trade regulations promoted by rent seekers from those arising from
Pigouvian policy making.  In section 3, a regression analysis links the
resulting regulatory indicator with the institutional setting and the
characteristics of trado policy.  In section 4, innovations in the regulatory
indicator are related to innovations in the growth rates of output and
exports, with a time lag of up to twenty years.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  Measuring  Endogenous  Trade  Policy
The extent of endogenous trade policy is quantified based on
legislation.  The selected foreign-trade regulations are reckoned on a yearly
basis over all the laws, decrees and administrative resolutions published by
the Uruguayan Registro  de Leyes  y  Decretos,  from 1925 to 1983.  The ending
year of the series corresponds to the last issue of the Aegistro.  The
starting year is chosen so as to include many observations prior to the
deepening of import substitution policies that took place during the 19300.
Since laws are passed by the Parliament, v areas both decrees and
resolutions are approved by the Executive, rent-seeking costs probably differ
from statute to statute.  Yet, they are all added up without any weighting, in
order to minimize data manipulation.  Similarly, no distinction is made
between different protection instruments (tariffs, quotas, etc.).  In this
connection, it is worth recalling that the price and quantity means of trade
intervention are equivalent when markets are competitive and there is no
uncertainty.
3In a first  stage,  only regulations  explicitly  identifying  their  promotor
are  taken into  account,  so as to make sure  that they  result  from  private
demands. Quite.  surprisingly,  in  many cases  this in not  hidden.  Consider  for
instance  the  following  paragraph,  from  a resolution  passed  in 1937:
"thereas  the records  related  to the application  for  a new gauging
of Saccman-type  clay  tiles;  provided  that  Mr. Horacio  Acosta  y
Lara,  owner  of  a national  firm  manufacturing  this  product,  takes
steps  in  order  to raise  that gauging  since  he considers  that the
low  price  on which  customs  tariff  is based  damages  his own
interests  and  puts  him in disadvantage  relative  to fore.gn
industry...  "
This resolution,  which  accedes  to the  request,  is not  at all  oxceptional.
Generally,  the  promoters  of  these  regulations  are private  firms  or
guilds (in  two  cases,  with the support  of the  corresponding  trade unions).
Some  of them  have  an astonishing  lobbying  capacity. For example,  over the
whole  1925-83  period,  71 foreign-trade  regulations  were  approved  for  the
benefit  of a single  textile  firm,  and  39 in favor  of one  manufacturing  firm  in
the  rubber  sector.  This ls not far  from  an average  of one  additional
regulation  per  year.
However,  not  all  the statutes  explicitly  mentioning  the  name of their
promoters  are included  in  the series.  Particularly,  regulations  allowing
special  import  regimes  for  public-sector  agencies  and  for non-profit
organizations  are omitted,  unless  tho  ultimate  beneficiary  of  the transfer  is
clearly  a private  firm  or  sector. 5 Moreover,  regulations  whose  approval  is
required  by foreign  governments  based  on reciprocity,  or to comply  with
international  agreements,  are not included  either.  With  these adjustments,
For instance,  in 1942  the local  government  of Salto  obtained  a
duty  exemption  to import  the  wood used for  packing  oranges. With
Salto  being  the  main citrus  supplLer  in Urugt'ay,  the  measure  is
accounted  as if it  resulted  from  private  rent seeking.
4the number of  regulations in this first group amounts to 1,849 foor  the whole
1925-83 period.
In a second stage, statutes whlch have no identified promoter but
concern a small number of products (too eulall  to ariae from  Pigouvian policy
making) are added to the series.  The basic criterion iu to include all
regulations modifying the import or e'port regime of no more than ton  items at
once, either final goods or inputs.  This boundary between endogenous and
Pigouvian policy making is, of course, arbitrary.  But changing the boundary
does not modify the -attern of the series.  This suggests that there are two
distinct  types  of  Uruguayan  foreign-trade  regulaticns.
These  statutes  are  counted  no  matter  whether  the  resulting  transfers  are
permanent  or  transitory.  Regulations  extending  an  already  existing  benefit
are  included  too,  with  the exception of periodical  inflation adjustments for
the gaugings on  which  import  .ariffs  are  calculated.  In  all  the  cases,  if  the
statutes concern simultaneously two to ten final goods or inputs, a separate
regulation is accounted for  each  of  the  items,  unless  they correspond to the
same  industry.
After including the second group, the number of regulations in the
series more than doubles, reaching 3,973 for the whole period.  But note that
this underestimAtes  the actual figure, since the Registro publishes all law.
and decrees, but only the most important administrative resolutions.
Repeating the procedure deecribed above for year 1970 on the basis of the
Oiario  Oficial, which includes all resolutions,  leads to a substantially
higher  number  of  regulations. 6 This  bias  is  aseumed  to  be  stable  over  time.
In  what  follows,  the  number  of  regulations  in  the  series  in  year  t  is
identified as  ATt.  These  include  regulations on imports AN*,  and  regulations
6  Since the Diarzo  Of iclal  is issued daily, building the time series
on this basis would represent an enormous amount of work, and
therefore oblige to shorten considerably the period studied.
5on exports AXt.7  Figure 1 shows the evolution of the three variables over
time.  It can be seen that the aggregate series ATt *a. a first peak in the
1940,, and a huge second one in the 1970s.  The  former results baoically from
a large number of regulations on imports, particularly  after the end of  World
War II.  The latter, on the contrary, is due almost exclusively to regulatione
on exports.
(Insert  Figure 1)
3.  Explaining  Endogenous  Trade  Policy
Changes in the extent ot endogmnous policy making cannot be directly
inferred from Figure 1, since the size of the Uruguayan economy has changed
over time.  Consequently,  the absolute number of regulations has to be scaled.
wrom a theoretical point of view, the most appropriate deflator would be the
number of firms, at least in the manufacturing sector.  Unfortunately,
Uruguayan industry surveys are scattered and incomplete, particularly when it
comes to small units.1 Hence, more standard deflators have to be chosen.
The first one is the aggregate output level Yt. The problem with this
series is that it is available only since 1935, so that ten yearly
observations on foreign-trade regulations have to be set aside.  The second
one is the exports level Xt,  which is available for the whole period.y  The
problem here is the significant short-run variability of the data.  Since none
of the deflators can be considered fully satisfactory, both have to be used in
7  One would expect AN  + AXt  ATt.  However, this is nct true for
all years, since 6 of the statutes were ambiguous enough to
pre%ent their claosifl ation.
8  Just to give an idea on what the data in Figure 1 mean, it is
worth pointing out that there were only 158 manufacturing firms
with more than fifty personnel in 1936, and 421 in 1968.
9  Using the imports level would lead to similar results, since
international capital movements had a limited extent until the
mid-1970s.
6Figure  1
ENDOGENOUS  FOREIGN-TRADE  REGULAT!ONS
Passed  per year
Absolute  number
200'-
150-
100  I
50
1925  1930  1935  1940  1945  1950  1955  1?60  1965  1970  197-5 1980
On Imports  On exports  Totalorder to get some infoLmation on the extent of endogenous policy making.
Throughout, series scaled by  Y  or by X are indicated by  subscripts y or
x respectively.  For instance, AMy is identically equal to AM/Y, AX, is
identically equal to AX/X and so on.l°  All these ratios are scaled so an  to
average one hundred over the whole period.  Figure 2 shows the evolution of
ATy and AT.,  which are the most general indicators.  Although the series
deflated by exports experiencee larger fluctuations, the pattern is similar in
both cases.11
(Insert Figure 2)
In Figure 2, the import-substitution peak of the 1940s is higher than
the export-promotion peak of the 19708.  During the 1960s and the 1980u, in
turn, endogenous policy making seems less prevalent, although the series never
return to the level of the late 1920s and early 1930a.  Obviously,  the next
question is  whether the observed fluctuations are associated w-ith  changes Ln
either institutions or economic policy choices.  These changes are briefly
summarized in Table 1.
(Insert Table 1)
At a first glance, it could appear that only the form of endogenous
policy making is affected, since the aim of regu:ltions keeps evolving over
time so as to overrule changes in legislation.  For instance, there is a large
number of statutes setting special exchange rates until 1959, when the latter
are replaced by explicit tariffs; then, the goal of regulations  shifts to
modifying the level of these tariffs.  The pattern is similar in 1982, when
10  Time subscripts are omitted for simplicity.
11  Important differences are associated with the drop of sales abroad
during the 1942 drought, and to the periodical decline of beef
exports tin 1951, 1957 and 1965) arising from the cattle cycle.
7Figure  2
THE EXTENT  OF ENDOGENOUS  T-RADE  POLICY
Regulations  scaled by economic activity
Average  = 100.0
300 -
250  -
200-
150-
100 
50  -
O  ,,
1925  1930  1935  1940  1945  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980
- Deflator  = output  --  Deflator  = exportsTable 1
POLITICS  AND ECONOMIC  POLICY  IN URUGUAY
Presidential
1P)1TICAl,  paregime  h  bia  The "mild"  Presidential regime until 1951  and again  Mi]itar 1E01-TICAI,  party sha-  dictator-  after 1967.  Between both, bi-party colle-  dictatorshi REGIME  binc  adoip-  ship  giate  +  sharlng  of  public  administration
Istration
Single  Until  1973.  dual  exchange  rate  re- EXCHAMNGE  exchange  Multiple  exchanba  rates  since  1933-34.  gime:  one  (low)  for  trade  opera- RATE  rate  A different  exchange  rate  allowed  for  tlons.  the  other  (high)  for  finan- (gold  each  foreign  trade  operation  in  1937.  cial  transactions.  In 1974,  they standard)  are  unified  and  controls  abolished.
tariff  of  In 1931,  a  482 tariff  is  allowed  for  firms  Multiple  exchange  rates Gradual  re- 3tarifree  proving  that  they  face  import  competition. are  replaced  by  expli-  duction  of IMPORTS  import  Import  licenses  are  established  in  1938.  cit tariffs,  but  t0-  protective import  In  1941,  a  central  bureau  is  created  to  latter  include  man,  barriers. inputs  manage  all  foreign  trade  operations.  different  duties.
Export  subsidies  are  Subs- There  are  taxes  on traditional  exports  (beef,  wool  and  allowed  since  1964.  The crip- EXPORTS  tanned  hides)  until  1975. Some  exports  (cattle  on the  regime  is  enlarged  in  tion hoof,  non-tanned  leather  ...  ) are  banished  in  order  to  1967  and  1970. Wide-  to  the provide  cheap  inputs  to  the  manufacturing  sector.  spread  use  of these  sub-jGATT's
1926111  1930  1936  190  1l  1  0  1  5  1  0  1  sid9es7  since 19745  1cde
1926  1,930  1936  1940  1946  1960  1966  1960  1966  1970  1976  1980imports  start  to be clustered  in  groups  with the  same  protection  rate;  then,
regulations  aim increasingly  at raising  the  reference  prices  on which  tariffs
are  applied,  or at changing  positions  from  cluster  to cluster.
However,  a more careful  analysis  shows  that institutions  and  the
orientations  guiding  economic  policy  do also  have an impact  on the extent  of
endogenous  trade  policy. The analysis  in based  on ordinary  least-squares
regressions  of indicators  ATy,  ATE,  ... ,  AXs  on their  lagged  values  and  a  on
set  of three  dummy  variables  arising  from  Table  1.  These  variables  are
intended  to capture  dictatorship,  a development  strategy  based  on import
substitution,  and active  export  promotion. In what follows  they  are indicated
as DP, IS  and  SP respectively.
Variable  DP is set  equal  to ze:o  until  1932,  and from 1943  to 1972. It
is  equal  to .5  during  the Omild  dictatorship*  (so  called  because  some
democratic  institutions  were kept)  and  equal  to 1 during  the tough  military
dictatorship  starting  in 1973.12  From a  theoretical  viewpoint,  the  expected
sign  for  the  DP coefficient  is ambiguous. on the one  hand,  the lack  of
possibilities  for  criticizing  decisions  could  increase  the supply  for
protection  by  policy  makers.  But  on the  other  hand,  reduced  political
competition  could  also lead  to a lower  demand  for  protection  by parties. 1 3
The  two  other  dummies  reflect  the  main  orientations  guiding  the  conduct
of trade  policy. Variable  IS is null  until  1930.  It is equal  to one  from
1931  to 1959,  a stage  in  which inward-oriented  growth  was seen as the  key  to
economic  development  by successive  governments. It  takes  the value  of .5
since  1960,  when  multiple  exchange  rates  were abolished. And it becomes  null
since  1974,  when a gradual  reduction  of barriers  to imports  started. Since
import-substitution  policies  are  discretionary,  the coefficient  of Is is
expected  to be positive.
12  An attempt  to distinguish,  within  democratic  rule,  between
presidential  regime  and  bi-party  collegiate  did not lead  to
signiticant  coefficients.
13  Among  the few  analyses  on this issue,  see  Tullock (1986).
8Periods are relatively similar for EP, although these two orientations
should not be seen as mutually exclusive.  Thus, EP is  set equal to zero until
1963 and equal to .5 since 1964, when export subsidies were established.  It
takes the value of one in 1974, when these subsidies started to be used on a
large scale.  Finally, it becomes null again in 1980, after Uruguay subscribed
to the GATT's code of subsidies.14 The expected coefficient of EP is also
positive.
An attempt was made to include business-cycle indicators among the
independent variables.  Indeed, adverse shocks could stimulate a shift of the
affected production factors out of economic activity and into political
activity, leading to the so-called "compensation effect"  (Maggee, Brock and
Young, 1989, chapter 11).  Conversely, technological innovations proceeding at
a fast pace could hinder the social and economic stability required  for
distributional coalitions to emerge (Olson, 1982, chapter 3).  However,  when
the terms-of-trade level and the growth rate of output tiere  included in the
analysis, no significant coefficients were obtained either for their current
or their lagged values.
Regression  results  are reported in Table 2.15  Since the endogenous
variables  average  one  hundred  over  the  whole period, the coefficients
associated  with  the  dutmies  can  be  seen  as  the  contemporary  percentage
increases  in  the  extent  of  endogenous trade policy which result from changes
in  institutions  and  in  economic  policy  orientations.  The  long-run  effect  of
these changes is obtained by taking into account the coefficient on the lagged
endogenous variable.16
14  with these periods, the correlation coefficient between  IS and EP
is -. 51.
IS  Previously,  it was checked that the scaled numbwr of regulations
was  stationary in all cases (for  technical details, see the
Appendix).
16  For instance, the long-run value of AT, increases by 103%
(= 40.75/(1-.604)) after shifting from democracy to dictatorship.
Note that the "percentage" interpretation is not accurate when the
dependent variable departs from the average of hundred.  But the
log specification cannot be used since there are years with no
9(Insert  Table 2)
At the aggregate level, when no distinction is made between regulations
on imports and regulations on exports, all the coefficients are positive and
highly significant.  The same happens when only regulations on exports are
taken into account.  The  effect of both dictatorship and export promotion
becomes much weaker in the case of regulation. on imports.  But it is worth
noting that coefficients on discretionary policies are positive in all the
regressions.
At the aggregate level also, import substitution appears to be more
harmful than export promotion, since its effect on the extent of endogenous
policy making is larger by about two thirds.  This result seems in accordance
with a considerable amount of empirical evidence on the relative performance
of inward- and outward-oriented economies (for a comprehensive survey, see
Leamer, 1992).  However, the endogenous variables in Table 2 concern
endogenous trade policy, not economic performance.  The question remains
whether there is a link between these two variables.
4.  The  Growth  Effects  of  Endogenous  Trade  Policy
The literature on the welfare costs of endogenous trade policy is mainly
concerned with static costs.  This is the case, particularly, with the
analysis on the dissipation of rents by competition among potential
beneficiaries.  If the gains from trade intervention are seen as a prize to be
contested, risk-neutral rent seekers are expected to allocate an amount of
resources approximately equal to the prize to influence the outcome of the
political content.  These expenditures  (called the Tullock cost) may be by far
larger than the deadweight loss (or  Harberger cost) traditionally associated
with barriers  to trade.
endogenous regulations on exports.
10Table  2
THE  DETERMINANTS  OF  ENDOGENOUS  TRADE  POLICY
Lagged
End.  *nd.  2
var.  Years  Cons.  var.  DP  IS  UP  R  Q(10)
ATY  1936-83  -19.39  0.604  40.75  59.21  31.98  0.70  9.611
(-1.382)  (5.929)  (2.991)  (2.912)  (2.283)
ATX  1926-83  3.68  0.545  25.82  48.85  28.20  0.56  9.892
(0.289)  (5.462)  (1.865)  (3.159)  (1.589)
AMY 1936-83  14.02  0.376  13.50  63.46  5.47  0.58  3.007
(0.811)  (2.762)  (0.955)  (2.654)  (0.321)
AML 1926-83  21.58  0.463  -2.30  51.83  8.22  0.54  10.872
(1.535)  (4.142)(-0.157)  (3.054)  (0.442)
AX.  1936-83  -65.31  0.615  87.61  91.62  82.02  0.73  7.701
(-2.314)  (6.607)  (3.231)  (2.998)  (2.975)
AXa  1926-83  -21.75  0.588  66.89  52.28  68.08  0.64  5.364
(-0.999)  (6.267)  (2.481)  (2.111)  (2.209)
Notes  Numbers  in  parenthesis  are  t-statistics.  The  Q(10)  are  the  Box-
Pierce  statistics.Within  the neoclassical framework, both types of costs lead to level
effects, analogous to once-and-for-all downward shifts in production
possibilities, and not to growth effects (see  Lucas, 1988).  Yet, there is a
strong suspicion in the sense that endogenous trade policy reduces the growth
rate of the economy.  The recent vintage of literature on endogenous growth
has provided two analytical frameworks whhic give some support to this
suspicion.
The  first  one  emphasizes  the  role of non-cooperative equilibria among
identical  rent  seekers  (see  Terrones,  1990,  and  Rama,  1992).  Each  of  the
latter may allocate some of his time or resources to carry out influence
activities which are individually profitable, but socially wasteful.  This
reduces, period after period, the amount of time or resources available for
accumulation of the reproducible factor (i.e.  human or physical capital).
Thus, the growth rate of the economy is lower the higher the negative
externality associated with influence activities.
The second approach stresses adverse selection among individuals who
differ one from another by their talent (see  Murphy, Shleifer  and Vishny,
1991).  Each of them has to choose whether to be a wage earner, an
entrepreneur or a rent seeker.  In countries where rent seeking rewards talent
more than entrepreneurship does, the most able  people concentrate on the
former activity.  Assuming that growth depends on innovations, and that
innovations  are  made  only  by  talented  entrepreneurs,  such  countries  are
characterized by low rates of growth.
This paper addresses the connection between endogenous trade policy and
economic growth from a purely empirical viewpoint.  The chosen approach is
very much in the spirit of Chapter 1 in Blanchard and Fischer  (1989).  First,
univariate models are fitted to the rates of growth of output and exports, and
to the six indicators measuring the extent of endogenous trade policy.17
The estimated residuals of these processes can be seen as the series'
innovations.  Then, a correlation analysis is carried out between innovations
17  Technical details are reported in the Appendix.
11in growth rates and lagged innovations in endogenous trade policy.  A time lag
of up to twenty years is allowed so as to capture long-run effects.
Since there are six indicators measuring the extent of endogenous trade
policy (ATY,  ... ,  AXx)  and two growth rates (output and exports), twelve
correlation analyses are carried out.  In spite of the measurement  errors
reportad in section 2, so-ew  clear patterns emerge from this exercise.  In
addition, it is apparent that results do not depend very much on whether
regulations are deflated by output or by exports.  The coments  that follow
highlight some of the most illustrative combinations of variables.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the extent of endogenous trade
policy and the growth rate of output.  The upper panel is based on the
aggregate series (ATy),  while the lower panel considers regulations  on imports
only (AMY).  In both cases, a significantly positive correlation  is observed
after three or four years.  This can be due to the fact that foreign-trade
regulations usually create a potential rent, which can be appropriated only by
investing in the favored sector.
(Insert Figure 3)
However, the above paragraph explains sectoral growth.  It cannot
account for growth at the aggregate level.  According to the theory of
international trade, an increase in the number of trade regulations  should
lead to a once-and-for-all drop in output.  And it could even account for a
permanent reduction in the growth rate of the economy, according to the theory
of endogenous growth.  The significantly positive correlation reported by
Figure 3 suggests that other elements, not taken into account by these
theories, do matter in the short run.
The results are quit, different in the long &an.  According to Figure 3,
the positive effect disappears after the fourth year, and becomes
significantly negative more than ten years later.  This would be  :onsistent
with Schumpeter's view of competition as the engine of economic growth.  But
12Figure  3
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Note:  The  horizontal  lines  indicate  statistically  significant  correlation
coefficients  at the  5% level.it is worth noting the extent of the time lags involved.  In the Uruguayan
case, the endogenous trade policy peak of the 19409 would account (at least
partly) for stagnation in the 1960..  Similarly, the country should suffer in
the 1990. the effects of the endogenous trade policy peak of the 19708.
Figure 4 reports the relationship between the extent of endogenous trade
policy  and  the  growth  rate  of  exports.  The  upper  panel  is  based  again  on  the
aggregate  series  (ATy),  while  the lower one concerns regulations on exports
only (AXy).  Here,  the  positive  impact  seems  much  more  moderate,  and  takes
place within a shorter time lag.  But the most  Lmpressive thing in Figure 4 is
the steady and long-lasting negative impact of endogenous trade policy on the
growth  rate  of  exports.
(Insert  Figure  4)
5.  Concluding  Remarks
This  paper  presented  time  series on a well-defined  type of endogenous
trade  policy  comprising  almost  six  decades.  This  allowed  to  show  that
import-substitution  strategies  increase  the  extent  of  endogenous  policy
making.  It also allowed to show that the latter has a negative long-run
effect  on  the  growth  rates  of  output  and  exports.  This  is consistent with
both  theoretical  analysis  and  econmic  intuition.  Hence,  in  spite  of
measurement  errors,  the  series  in  this  paper  probably  convey  information  on
actual economic trends.18
Some  other  results  are  more  unexpected.  First  of  all,  the  extent  of
endogenous  trade  policy  also  increases  under  active  export  promotion.  This
suggests  that  the  main  reason  underlying  the  observed  differences  in  the
18  Of  course,  this  is  just  a  first  step  in  the  analysis  of  the
presented data set.  New insights could be drawn from a higher
disaggregation  of the data, by looking at the contents of the
regulations or at the favored activity sectors.  A first attempt
of  sectoral  analysis  can  be  found  in  Rama  (1992).
13Figure  4
ENDOGENOUS TRADE  POLICY  AND  EXPORTS  GROWTH
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Note:  The  horizontal  lines  indicate  statistically  significant  correlation
coefficients  at  eL.e 5%  level.economic performance of inward- and outward-oriented countries may not be the
mere  existence  o_.  wasteful distributiona. activities.  Since the latter urm
to characterize both types of policy orientations, it is worth looking at
competing explanations, such as those stressing increasing returns to scale,
or R&D activities.
A  second  unexpected  result  concerns  the  relationship  between  the
political regime in  force  and  the  extent  of  endogenouu  trade  policy.  ThLs  is
in contradiction with the conventional assertion that dictatorships  are more
efficient than democracies.  More generally, the results point out that the
extent of endogenous trade policy increases with the discretionary  power on
the part of political agents, no matter whether such a power arises from
political conditions or from economic orientations.
Finally, the relationship between the extent of endogenous  trade policy
and the lagged growth rates of  output and exports appears to be less direct
than expected.  Although there is a negative long-run effect, the involved
time  lags  are  surprisingly  long.  In  addition,  the  short-run  effect  is
positive.  This  would  point  out  that  the  social  value  of  resources  invested  in
the  protected  sector  is  higher  than  the  corresponding  private  cost. 19
Whatever  the  reasons,  the  observed  time pattern suggests that the loss  of
political support by policy makers supplying protection could be smaller than
is usually assumed.
19  Such would be the case if there were positive  externalities  from
investment in the protected sector, or if there were  idle
production factors in the economy.  Similarly, the social value of
the resources invested in lobbying could be negative, as
considered by Bhagwati  (1982).
14TECHNICAL  APPENDIX
Table  A-1 displays  some statistical  properties  of the eight  time series
used for  the  analysis  in sections  3 ar.d  4.  The augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test
was  performed  on each  of these  series  in  order  to check  for  unit roots.  The
results  suggest  that  both output  and  exports  have a stochastic  time trend,
whereas  the  extent  of endogenous  trade  policy  is stationary  (the  unit root
hypothesis  is  rejected  for 4  out of 6 indicatoro). It follows  that the
regressions  in section  3 have standard  statistical  properties. But  notice
that  even if  the extent  of endogenouo  trade  policy  was non stationary,  the  t
coefficients  of the dummies  and the  constant  terms  would still  have an
asymptotic  normal  diotribution.
The innovations  used in the  correlation  analysis  in section  4 are  the
residuals  of univariate  models  estimated  for  each of the eight  variables. The
order  of differentiation  d results  from  the  discussion  in the paragraph  above.
Orders  p and  q, in  turn,  are  chosen  based  on the  Akaike's  Information
Criterion  (AIC),  after  performing  a grid search  over 0 s p s 2 and 0 s  q  s 2.
It could  be argued  that  innovations  in the  extent  of endogenous  trade  policy
are  partly  due  to  regime  switching  (captured  through  dummy variables  in
section  3).  However,  switching  is  only  sporadic,  so  that  the  main  results
should  not  be  affected.
Finally,  the  correlation  analysis  was  also applied  to the relationship
between  lagged  growth  of  output  and  exports  on  the  one side,  and  the  extent  of
endogenous  trade  policy  on  the  other.  No  clear  patterns  emerged  from  this
exercise,  thus  suggesting  unidirectional  causality.  This  confirms  the  results
of  the  regression  analysis  in  section  3,  where  no  significant  coefficients
could  be obtained  for  business  cycle  variables,  either  contemporary  or lagged.
isTable  A-1
Testing  for
unit  roots
dia-be  r  ______
of obser-
Variable  vetiont  ADF  p  Estlmated  univariate process
-2 Log Y  54  -1.039  I  dlog  Y  *  0.019  - 0.666.diog  I  *  *  0.976.e  a  *  0.23  Q101  *  3.510
t  ~~~~ ~~t-l  t  t-1
(6.618)(-2.7291  14.264)
l.og  X  58  -0.351  I  diog X  *  0.015  *  *  - 0.620..  R  a  0.20  Q1101  - 4.066 t  t  t-l
(0.666)  1-3.8901
ATy  48  -2.107  0  ATy  *  3.841  *  *  *  0.784.-  a  =  0.42  QiOI  *  24.131 t  t  t-1
420.823  16.2611
.. 2 ATx  58  -3.186  0  ATx  *  24.23 *  0.643.ATx  *  0.08.ATa  * a  R  *  0.47  QllOI  a  6.343
*  t-l  t-2  t
(6.032)  44.684)  40.606)
AHy  48  -3.062  *  0  ANy  a  -0.316 *  1.290.ANY  - 0.30?.ANy  *  e  - 0.965.-  a  *  0.60  Q(10I a  6.896
t  t-I  t-a  t  *-1
4-0.0171  14.6331  (-1.3321  (-2.9715
ANx  58  -3.312  0  ANx  o  16.66  +  0.571.AJX  *  0.146.-AX  t *  a  *  0.45  0110) *  9.056 t  t-l  t-2  t
16.51793  4.2691  11.095)
AXy  48  -2.194  0  AXy  1.541  *  0.810.AXY  *  R  R  *  0.65  QlO)  I  5.669 t  i-I  t
12.3971  49.3783
AXx  58  -Z.765  *  0  AXx  *  8.600  *  0.763.AXX  *  R  R  *  0.58  Q1I01  *  4.748 t  t-l  t
12.7680  18.8781
Note: Numberz An parenthesis are t-estStatic.  The Q(101 are the Bao and Plarce statlatice.  The ADF column reports the t-atatietic for coetticient a  in the following specitication:
da  * p *  A  r  dA
t  t-1jl  1  I-i
witb z being each  of  the veriable. Indicated in the  first column ot the table.  The rejection of the  unit root  hypothbsi  at thbe 10  and 5X  level  ie  ind'cated  with  one  and two  asterisks respectively.REFERENCES
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